Mechanism design

Results: 750



#Item
31CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part II: Beyond Smoothness and XOS Valuations ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014

CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part II: Beyond Smoothness and XOS Valuations ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014

Add to Reading List

Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

- Date: 2014-05-13 09:33:25
    32CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #4: The Clinching Auction∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 15,

    CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #4: The Clinching Auction∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 15,

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

    - Date: 2014-01-27 13:39:49
      33PRIOR-INDEPENDENCE: A NEW LENS FOR MECHANISM DESIGN A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

      PRIOR-INDEPENDENCE: A NEW LENS FOR MECHANISM DESIGN A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

      - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:37
        34CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #20: Characterization of Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 12, 2014

        CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #20: Characterization of Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 12, 2014

        Add to Reading List

        Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

        - Date: 2015-01-30 15:19:36
          35CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part I: Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions Revisited ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014

          CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #17: Part I: Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions Revisited ∗ Tim Roughgarden† March 5, 2014

          Add to Reading List

          Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

          - Date: 2014-05-13 09:28:58
            362 Equilibrium The theory of equilibrium attempts to predict what happens in a game when players behave strategically. This is a central concept to this text as, in mechanism design, we are optimizing over games to find g

            2 Equilibrium The theory of equilibrium attempts to predict what happens in a game when players behave strategically. This is a central concept to this text as, in mechanism design, we are optimizing over games to find g

            Add to Reading List

            Source URL: jasonhartline.com

            - Date: 2016-01-19 15:44:49
              37Mechanism Design By Creditability Raphael Eidenbenz Yvonne Anne Oswald* Stefan Schmid** Roger Wattenhofer * speaker

              Mechanism Design By Creditability Raphael Eidenbenz Yvonne Anne Oswald* Stefan Schmid** Roger Wattenhofer * speaker

              Add to Reading List

              Source URL: www.tik.ee.ethz.ch

              - Date: 2015-05-18 12:16:23
                38Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap Qiqi Yan∗  Department of Computer Science Stanford University October 19, 2010

                Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap Qiqi Yan∗ Department of Computer Science Stanford University October 19, 2010

                Add to Reading List

                Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

                - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:36
                  39Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design  A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University

                  Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University

                  Add to Reading List

                  Source URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu

                  - Date: 2003-06-14 11:29:11
                    40CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #9: MIDR Mechanisms via Scaling Algorithms∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 5,

                    CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #9: MIDR Mechanisms via Scaling Algorithms∗ Tim Roughgarden† February 5,

                    Add to Reading List

                    Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

                    - Date: 2014-06-11 16:23:57